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Disruptions in the ordinary sense of selfhood underpin both pathological and
“enlightened” states of consciousness. People suffering from depersonalization can
experience the loss of a sense of self as devastating, often accompanied by intense
feelings of alienation, fear, and hopelessness. However, for meditative contemplatives
from various traditions, “selfless” experiences are highly sought after, being associated
with enduring peace and joy. Little is understood about how these contrasting dysphoric
and euphoric experiences should be conceptualized. In this paper, we propose a unified
account of these selfless experiences within the active inference framework. Building
on our recent active inference research, we propose an account of the experiences
of selfhood as emerging from a temporally deep generative model. We go on to
develop a view of the self as playing a central role in structuring ordinary experience
by “tuning” agents to the counterfactually rich possibilities for action. Finally, we explore
how depersonalization may result from an inferred loss of allostatic control and contrast
this phenomenology with selfless experiences reported by meditation practitioners. We
will show how, by beginning with a conception of self-modeling within an active inference
framework, we have available to us a new way of conceptualizing the striking experiential
similarities and important differences between these selfless experiences within a
unifying theoretical framework. We will explore the implications for understanding and
treating dissociative disorders, as well as elucidate both the therapeutic potential, and
possible dangers, of meditation.
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INTRODUCTION
In daily life, we take for granted the existence of a self: we feel that we are possessors of certain
qualities, the experiencers of certain sensations, that we are different and distinct from one
another, and that we endure from day to day. And yet, these assumptions have long been the
focus of skepticism within both Western and Eastern philosophical traditions. Thinkers from
various disciplines (e.g., from philosophy of mind, cognitive science, phenomenology, and Buddhist
philosophy) are beginning to collaborate on various topics revolving around self and subjectivity.
One lens through which philosophers and cognitive scientists have been recently exploring the
self is through cases where subjects report a loss, or diminishment, of their sense of self. These
reports occur most prominently in the context of psychiatric disorders such as depersonalization
(e.g., Colombetti and Ratcliffe, 2012; Seth et al., 2012; Miller et al., 2020), meditation (e.g., Britton,
2019; Lutz et al., 2019), and psychedelic drugs (e.g., Millière, 2017; Deane, 2020). The active
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inference framework—a popular approach to modeling action
and perception that uses principles of variational Bayesian
inference (Friston et al., 2017)—is particularly promising for
understanding these phenomena.
Our aim in this paper is to provide an updated account
of selfless experience within the active inference framework1.
By selfless experience, here, we mean the diminished sense
of self that is reported in a wide variety of cases including
depersonalization and meditative insight. Active inference and
predictive processing have already been used to provide accounts
of depersonalization in psychiatric contexts (Seth et al., 2012;
Gerrans, 2019), and although we find these accounts promising,
we seek to build on them in important ways. In particular, we
differ from existing accounts in taking affective valence and
control to be central to the sense of self. Building on existing
accounts of self-modeling within an active inference framework
(Seth, 2014; Hohwy and Michael, 2017; Friston, 2018), our
account casts the self-model in terms of an allostatic control
model (ACM; Deane, 2020), which we unpack in terms of
“agentive control” and “motivational” components. The central
thesis of this view is that the self is understood as an inference
about endogenous causes of self-evidencing outcomes. In simple
terms, this could be understood as the system modeling what
it wants (motivations) and what it can do (abilities). However,
we do not simply adopt the ACM for its own sake—there
are concrete explanatory payoffs. In particular, we are better
able to account for the wide range of selfless experiences
under a single unifying framework. Selfless experiences come
in a variety of flavors, ranging from the dysphoric and
dysfunctional experiences associated with depersonalization to
the euphoric and potentially superfunctional states sought after
by meditators. Our explanation of this difference is, as we will
see, an intrinsic part of our account of the emergence of these
phenomena themselves.
An important addition to this literature that we will make is a
reinterpretation of the role that affect plays in these processes. We
will argue that the sense of self arises from the system’s evaluation
of its own performance, or predictive control, of its own adaptive
behaviors. As we will see, the tracking of our performance, and
the allocation of resources (i.e., setting of precision), is being done
in part by affective systems. That is, we quite literally feel how well
adapted we are to a situation, and those feelings move us in ways
that are intended to improve that fit. This has the consequence
that our sense of being a self and affect are mechanistically
intertwined. This updated theoretical account of selfhood then
allows us to propose a more unified framework for understanding
various alterations in selfhood and affectivity.
We proceed as follows: In From the Free Energy Principle to
Hierarchical Predictive Processing, we give an overview of the
free energy principle and hierarchical predictive processing. In
A Control-Theoretic Perspective, we position these frameworks
within a control theoretic perspective and show how allostasis
can be formalized in terms of active inference. In Affect
in Deep Self-Models, we build on these ideas to present an
1See Ciaunica et al. (2020) for a recent phenomenological account of
depersonalization and meditative insight.
account of self-modeling in terms of allostatic control. In
Active Inference Accounts of Depersonalization and ACM Account
of Meditative Selflessness, we apply this model of the self
to address depersonalization and selfless experiences attained
through meditation, respectively. We wrap up and conclude by
comparing and contrasting these two dysphoric and euphoric
selfless experiences.
FROM THE FREE ENERGY PRINCIPLE
TO HIERARCHICAL PREDICTIVE
PROCESSING
The free energy principle (FEP; Friston, 2010) is an ambitious
unifying and overarching theory of life, according to which
biological systems naturally strive to minimize free energy.
The FEP starts from the observation of existence (Friston
and Stephan, 2007; Friston et al., 2010) and seeks to understand
how organisms maintain their existence by “tuning” to their
environmental niche, where the quantity of free energy is
understood as a measure of the disattunement (which is
equivalent to model “uncertainty”) between the agent and
environment (Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014). Crucially, in order
to exist and reproduce, agents must stay within conditions
that are conducive to continued existence—such as avoiding an
unacceptably high body temperature. Of course, this is phenotype
specific—the conditions that make continued existence viable
vary across species. Organisms must minimize free energy,
which is equivalent to maximizing the evidence of their model
and so their own existence (Friston, 2010, Hohwy, 2016).
Maximizing model evidence in this way is called “self-evidencing”
(Hohwy, 2016).
In animals like us (and many others), it has been proposed that
free energy is minimized, at least in large part, by hierarchical
predictive processing in the brain and central nervous system
(Friston, 2005; Clark, 2013, 2015). What the brain has to do,
on such a view, is minimize prediction error (free energy) as
efficiently as possible. This requires it to come up with an overall
hypothesis or model about what is going on in the world. This
hierarchical model generates predictions, and if it is inaccurate, it
generates prediction error and updates predictions accordingly.
A major challenge in model selection arises because the world
is a noisy and ambiguous place. Thus, there exists, at any given
time, more than one model that fits the incoming sensory signal.
This is where the notion of prior probability, often shortened
simply to prior, comes in (and with it, the Bayesian element
of the framework). This is the background probability of the
model independently of the evidence. For example, (adapting an
example from Pezzulo, 2014) before I hear my downstairs front
window creak open, there is a background probability concerning
the likelihood that I might be burgled. Whether I live in a high-
or low-crime neighborhood will influence the prior probability
of the “that’s a burglar!” model in response to the sound of the
creaking window (“the evidence”). Models are selected based on
both fit with current evidence and their prior probability. This
means that you can get trade-offs, for example, where a model
with a relatively low fit has a sufficiently high prior probability to
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be selected. For example, in the case of the hollow mask illusion,
the model with the best fit would be the (perceptually accurate)
“hollow concave face” model, but the slightly lower fit “normal
convex face” model has such a high prior probability that it is
selected instead, giving rise to the illusion.
This captures what the brain has to do, namely, resolve
ambiguity using priors (viz., in a Bayesian manner); however,
it does not tell us how this is implemented physically in the
brain. Put simply, the brain maximizes efficiency (minimizes free
energy) by being proactive and anticipatory. In other words, the
nervous system does not passively wait for inputs to come in.
Rather, even at the earliest stages of sensory processing, inputs
are greeted by a barrage of top–down prediction. This does not
just save time; it also saves energy and bandwidth, since the parts
of the incoming sensory signals that have already been accurately
predicted do not need to be passed up the processing hierarchy.
All that gets passed up is what is “newsworthy” (Hosoya et al.,
2005), namely, prediction error. Putting this all together, the
nervous system tries to minimize prediction error by coming up
with successful hierarchical predictive models that are chosen in
a Bayesian manner (namely, based on fit and prior).
There are two more important tweaks to this picture. The
first is to do with second-order prediction dynamics, namely,
how the brain deals with statistical volatility. This requires
introducing the notion of precision. In short, the world that we
live in does not just have variability but also predictable levels
of variability. As a result, our nervous systems learn over time
that there are contexts where environmental information is high
quality (trustworthy) and other contexts where it is not. For
example, in good lighting, visual information is relatively high
quality, whereas in poor lighting, it is relatively low. What an
optimal system will do in response to this is have a way of
setting second-order precision, namely, of appropriately varying
the extent to which prediction error should be taken seriously
(adjusted as a function of the likelihood of prediction error
being accurate or simply noise). In high-quality informational
contexts, it is expected that predictions will be good, and so
prediction errors will be given relatively high weight (or gain).
In low-quality contexts, prediction errors will be taken less
seriously. This turning up and down of the gain on prediction
error signaling is most commonly called precision weighting, and
it plays a role far beyond the second-order dynamics that we
used to introduce it. It is central to attention (Hohwy, 2012),
and to the bringing about of bodily movement, an issue to
which we now turn.
The second tweak comes when we note that, for embodied
creatures like ourselves, action is an ever-present part of our
existence. The Bayesian picture just described makes it look like
we are primarily in the business of updating our models to best
fit inputs from the world. However, of course, there are two ways
of responding to prediction error. You can, certainly, update the
model to better fit the world, but you can also update the world to
better fit the model. The former is known as perceptual inference,
and the latter is known as active inference. It is with the latter
that you get a PP account of action and basic motivation more
generally. Active inference, on our view, is central to allostasis, a
notion we introduce shortly.
A CONTROL-THEORETIC PERSPECTIVE
The foundations of active inference can be traced to control
theory. The idea that a system maintains existence by resisting
environmental disorder by acting to remain within a limited
repertoire of phenotype-congruent states is closely related to the
notion of maintaining “essential variables” (Ashby, 2013), where
an internal reference point (also known as a setpoint or goal
signal) is compared to the current state and the system acts so
as to restore conditions to the setpoint.
The principles of control-oriented predictive regulation (Seth
and Tsakiris, 2018) are very similar.
Here, the brain applies the same inferential machinery
of hierarchical predictive processing to infer and track key
homeostatic variables, using prior expectations and afferent
sensory information about the body coming “from within”
(Craig, 2003). In order to stay alive, organisms have to execute
the right actions to bring about state transitions that bring
bodily states into reasonable bounds (Pezzulo et al., 2015).
The phylogenetically endowed high precision on expectations
for staying within homeostatically viable states means that the
organism acts to realize prior beliefs corresponding to the
maintenance of essential variables (“goal priors”), for example,
eating to restore a blood sugar concentration to expected levels.
While goal priors originate in the maintenance of essential
variables (e.g., steady temperature, blood sugar levels, etc.), over
the course of ontogeny, an organism can acquire new goal priors
that are predictive on longer timescales of being relevant for
maintaining homeostasis—such as staying within a particular
social milieu (Matthews and Tye, 2019).
Active inference, then, formalizes homeostasis through a
control theoretic lens. Homeostasis from this perspective is
maintained not only through autonomic reflexes (i.e., sweating
to cool down) but also by prospective control. Such systems
anticipate future dyshomeostatic conditions before they arise and
proactively act to avoid them. This prospective control relates to
both inferences about current and future bodily states contingent
on certain actions (Sterling, 2012; Seth, 2014; Pezzulo et al., 2015).
This process of anticipatory action, by which the brain regulates
the needs of the body, is known as allostasis (Corcoran et al.,
2019). Active inference formally articulates allostasis, such that
agents anticipate surprising outcomes before they arise and act in
order to minimize uncertainty about potential future outcomes
(Sterling, 2012; Pezzulo et al., 2015, 2018).
On the active inference formulation, the action selection
process itself is cast as a problem of inference, where agents
must infer the active sampling of the world that realizes prior
preferences and minimizes uncertainty (Kaplan and Friston,
2018). Action selection, then, depends on the use of a deep
temporal model, where policies (sequences of actions) are
selected based on prior expectations of the quantity of free
energy that the agent expects itself to average over time
(“expected free energy”) given a particular policy or course of
action (Pezzulo et al., 2015; Friston et al., 2017). Intuitively,
some courses of action (such as riding in the train carriage)
have lower expected free energy than others (such as riding
on the roof). Crucially, this involves anticipating unfavorable
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or dyshomeostatic conditions before they arise and acting to
minimize uncertainty about potential future outcomes (Friston
et al., 2015, 2017). On this account, higher levels of the cortical
hierarchy, tracking regularities unfolding on longer timescales
(Kiebel et al., 2008), contextualize lower levels by anticipating the
downstream consequences of action and selecting policies that
minimize expected free energy according to these expectations
(Friston, 2010; Pezzulo et al., 2015). For example, my longer-term
goal of successfully catching the train includes expectations about
what I need to do to get to the station on time, which in turn
unpacks into subgoals such as getting in my car and lower-level
action–prediction loops as I use the pedal, gearstick, and so on.
In order to minimize free energy over longer timescales,
active inference requires balancing the pragmatic and epistemic
value of different actions. The pragmatic (or instrumental) value
of an action or action policy (a sequence of actions) refers to
the probability of it resulting in sensory states that fulfill some
prior preference or goal state, such as maintaining a viable
body temperature. Epistemic value refers to the reduction in
uncertainty or information gain expected under a given action
or action policy (Kaplan and Friston, 2018). Epistemic action
allows organisms to increase an agent’s ability to reduce free
energy by increasing their understanding of the predictable
aspects of the environment. Information-seeking behavior such
as novelty seeking and curiosity can be accounted for within
this formulation in terms of epistemic action (Friston et al.,
2015; Mirza et al., 2016; Kiverstein et al., 2017; Kaplan and
Friston, 2018; Pezzulo and Nolfi, 2019). Intrinsic motivation
(and epistemic foraging) can be understood here in terms of
uncertainty reduction (Barto, 2013). Simulations of economic
decision making and epistemic foraging behavior have been
built based on this view that the probability of a policy is
proportional to expected free energy (Friston et al., 2014, 2015,
2017). Active inference formulations of planning and navigation
have been used to dissolve the “explore–exploit” dilemma, as
the agent simply needs to act so as to minimize uncertainty
(i.e., free energy; Kaplan and Friston, 2018). Agents engaging
active inference do not just keep themselves in the states that are
expected; rather, they anticipate in order to minimize uncertainty
about potential future outcomes (Schwartenbeck et al., 2013;
Friston et al., 2014, 2015, 2017).
Now that we have introduced the control-theoretic notion of
allostasis, and how it is achieved via active inference, we next go
on to develop our view of the sense of self.
THE SENSE OF SELF AS A MODEL OF
ALLOSTATIC CONTROL
This section will argue that the self is best understood in terms
of an allostatic control model (ACM). Recently, a number of
computational models of the minimal sense of self (namely, the
self as implicitly present in everyday world-directed experience,
rather than something more overt and explicit like the self-
conception or narrative self) have been advanced in the active
inference literature (Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013; Seth,
2013; Apps and Tsakiris, 2014; Allen and Friston, 2016).
Common to these proposals is that the sense of self arises
inferentially within a hierarchical generative model. Our central
claim is that the inferential self-model arises from the system
tracking its own self-evidencing capabilities (Friston, 2018).
The purpose of tracking these capacities is to infer confidence
(precision) in potential action policies according to their expected
free energy and thereby arbitrate between potential actions
accordingly. Self-modeling of this kind, then, is fundamentally
related to selecting allostatic or anticipatory actions, where the
system preemptively infers and avoids unfavorable conditions
before they arise. By casting the self-model in terms of allostatic
control, we will connect our view in new ways to the prevalent
theme in neuroscience about the rich relationship between
affectivity and the self (Damasio, 2003; Seth, 2013; Allen and
Tsakiris, 2018). This view can be understood formally in terms
of a higher-level inference about “subjective fitness”—that is,
a higher level of the generative model that scores the “fit”
between the action model and the world (see Hesp et al., 2019
for a formal treatment and computational model of this idea).
Conceptually, our view of the sense of self can be decomposed
into “agentive control” and “motivational” components. We will
present these in turn.
Agentive Control
Recall that while perception involves updating the model to better
predict the incoming sensory input, action changes the incoming
sensory input to better fit the model. In selecting an action,
then, the system implicitly infers itself as able to bring about the
consequences of that action. A sense of agency, the sense of being
the one in control of an action, naturally emerges here as part of
model sampling (Friston et al., 2013)—in selecting an action, the
system implicitly infers itself as able to bring about the sensory
consequences of the action. On this view, the sense of control—
the expectation of being able to bring about certain consequences
given certain actions—is learned through past experiences of the
system inferring its own agentive capacities.
This connects closely with preexisting accounts of the sense
of agency, where the system infers its own agency based on
the ability to predict the outcome of a given action (Haggard,
2017). Here, attribution to endogenous causes (self), as opposed
to exogenous causes (world/other), occurs as the result of a
“comparator model,” where the sensory consequences of an
action are compared with the expected sensory consequences
(Frith, 2014). This allows the system to sculpt and improve motor
control, as the discrepancy between the sensory consequences of
an action are compared with the predicted (intended) outcomes.
The system can then act to iteratively reduce this discrepancy and
refine motor commands (Miall and Wolpert, 1996; Wolpert and
Flanagan, 2001).
Crucially for the current account, control is temporally
deep (Pezzulo, 2018), such that the agent not only has
predictions about the immediate consequences of actions but
also of consequences extending into the future. The sensory
consequences of a given action may be sensorially proximal (e.g.,
the immediate sensory consequences of hitting send on an email),
or sensorially distal and abstract (e.g., the expectation that when
you see that person they will know the information in the email).
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The system, then, must be able to track the outcomes of actions
on multiple timescales. Within the generative model, lower and
higher levels of the hierarchy track regularities unfolding at faster
and slower timescales, respectively (Kiebel et al., 2008). For an
organism with a temporally deep generative model, this includes
tracking its expected control of actions on short timescales (e.g.,
the expected sensory consequences of taking a step) and using
these inferences to inform inferences about the state of control on
temporally deep timescales (e.g., being able to walk a distance).
On this view, the system models itself as an agent according
to this hierarchically deep inference about its own endogenous
control of sensation via its actions. In other words, I have a sense
of what I can do based on past experience of acting in the world
and come to expect myself as a controller over my future actions.
Motivation
The motivational component of our view of the self-model is
understood in terms of goal priors and, as such, connects closely
to views of selfhood grounded in interoception (Seth and Friston,
2016; Barrett, 2017; Seth and Tsakiris, 2018). This is because the
system will be generally more concerned about controlling the
“essential variables” (i.e., homeostatic set points like blood sugar
levels) tracked by interoception than variables inferred through
exteroception and proprioception, which are less likely to pertain
directly to homeostasis (Seth, 2014; Seth and Tsakiris, 2018).
Creatures tracking longer timescales can augment this with
deep goal hierarchies (see Pezzulo et al., 2018), where fulfillment
of longer-term goals can be traded off with fulfillment of shorter-
term goals. On this view, low-level maintenance of “essential
variables” are phylogenetically endowed expectations that, due
to an “a priori hyperprecision of visceral channels” (Allen and
Friston, 2016, p. 7), the system must act to fulfill, rather than
simply updating via perceptual inference. One example would
be moving to the shade under a tree to maintain viable body
temperature. Divergence from these fundamental, phenotype-
congruent low-level prior expectations tunes attention and
amplification of sensory signals. This manifests itself to the
system as, for example, the feeling of hunger (interoceptive
prediction error) or a violation of the “healthy body condition”
prior in the case of pain (Ongaro and Kaptchuk, 2019). These
interoceptive changes tune the organism to the appropriate
action opportunities in the given context, such as finding
food to resolve interoceptive prediction errors or removing the
source of pain. Crucially, pain is tuned relative to expectations
given the context (Moutoussis et al., 2014). In the case of an
approaching bear, the prospective inference about imminent
catastrophic prediction error of being eaten trumps the proximal
pain of a twisted ankle, and the selected policy is running
away. Put another way, hierarchically deep contextualization of
interoceptive signals tunes an organism to appropriate actions
and engagements with the environment (Pezzulo and Cisek,
2016) and assigns appropriate precision to priors and ascending
prediction errors. For low-level drives and motivations, this is
intuitive—the hungry organism is tuned to capitalize on eating
opportunities present in the environment. Precision on goals
tracking different timescales are continually being traded off
between levels—such as refraining from eating chocolate cake in
the present for the sake of a longer-term goal of sticking to a diet
(Pezzulo et al., 2018).
The sense of self, then, emerges as the result of a hierarchically
deep inference about the system’s control of its own self-
evidencing outcomes. In the generative model, this means that
the sense of self can be understood in terms of a higher-level
inference about the “fit” between the current action model and
the world. By fit here we mean how well or poorly one is doing
at reducing error over time relative to expectations. As we will
see in the next section, a key implication of this picture is that
self-modeling is fundamentally affective, where affective changes
in the body tracks how well the organism is doing at fulfilling its
own goal priors (“subjective fitness;” Joffily and Coricelli, 2013;
Seth and Friston, 2016; Kiverstein et al., 2017). An upshot of this
picture is that self-modeling, and indeed the feeling of being a
self, is connected to affect in ways previously underappreciated in
the literature, as we will explore next.
Affect in Deep Self-Models
The previous section argued for a view of self-modeling as a
higher-level inference about the system’s allostatic control. In our
view, as we will now see, minimal self-modeling and affect are
coconstitutive, such that affect can be understood as an inference
about the performance of the action model in bringing about
self-evidencing outcomes. This section unpacks how inference
about allostatic control, manifesting affectively, is central to the
allocation of precision.
In tracking the performance or “fitness” of the model over
time, the system becomes sensitive to the rate of error reduction.
In selecting a policy, the system has prior expectations of the
rate at which error is likely to be reduced over time. The system
can then evaluate whether its performance at reducing error is
better or worse relative to its prior expectations. We can think
of each agent’s performance in reducing error then in terms
of a slope that plots the various speeds that prediction errors
are being accommodated relative to their expectations. Changes
in the rate at which error is reduced (referred to as “error
dynamics”) turns out to be an important source of information
for a predictive organism, as it reflects the efficiency, and so
the quality, of its action model performance over time. As
such, error dynamics play an important role in tuning precision
estimations—increasing or decreasing our beliefs in the reliability
of the model generating the policy (Kiverstein et al., 2017; Hesp
et al., 2019). If precision is set based on estimations of how
likely some action is to lead to the expected result, then the
efficiency—the rate at which error is reduced—of those actions
to reduce error should be taken into consideration. Greater than
expected error for a given policy is evidence that the system
should downregulate precision on the action model. Sensitivity
to error dynamics increases our capacity to reduce prediction
error over longer timescales, as it affords a means to toggle
confidence levels on the action model according to the volatility
of the environment.
The phenomenological manifestation of this (subpersonal)
sensitivity to error reduction rates over time is affect. There
is a growing literature that supports the view that affective
changes not only track changes in immediate divergences from
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the homeostatic ideal, as was the focus of earlier predictive
accounts of interoception (see Seth, 2013), but also tracks the rate
of change in error management over time (Joffily and Coricelli,
2013; Kiverstein et al., 2017; Van de Cruys, 2017). Valenced
bodily feelings (i.e., positive and negative hedonic tone) are, in
part, a reflection of how well or poorly we are reducing error
over time relative to expectations. When error is being reduced
slower than expected, and the organism is becoming increasingly
disattuned to its environment, this change is marked by feelings
of frustration and disappointment. The negatively valenced
bodily feelings provide the organism with feedback about the
reliability of the selected action policies, indicating a need to
downregulate precision on those policies. In contrast, when error
is being managed at a better than expected rate, the organism
is gripping the scene well, the bodily feedback are positive
feelings of hope and satisfaction, and precision is upregulated.
It is intuitive that persistently worse than expected rates of error
reduction on a given goal prior act as a disincentive to pursue
that goal and motivate the system to select a more achievable
goal, and doing well is motivating to continue to realize a
certain goal. Precision does not just concern the organism here
and now and its momentary state of uncertainty but is instead
helping it to continuously improve working toward managing
uncertainty over time. Importantly, positive and negative feelings
alter precision relative to the rate at which we have come to expect
errors to be resolved.
Affective valence here is being reimagined within the active
inference framework as a domain general controller that tracks
and assigns precision relative to changes in our expected rates
of error reduction (that is, expected reductions in free energy;
Kiverstein et al., 2017; Hesp et al., 2019). Inference about
how well the system is self-evidencing as a whole is tracking
a long-term dimension of the self, which is necessarily more
invariant and abstract in virtue of tracking a longer timescale,
showing less variability than “lower” aspects of the self-model
that are more amenable to changing across contexts. Negative
and positive feelings then track lesser than expected and greater
than expected allostatic control, respectively. This higher-order
inference about the system’s confidence in its own action model,
used to modulate precision on expected free energy (Hesp et al.,
2019), is a candidate computational correlate for the sense of
self—the feeling of being an agent.
This account of self-modeling as mechanistically intertwined
with affectivity is, at present, a theoretical proposal. However,
recent work (most notably Hesp et al., 2019) provides proof
of principle of how this theoretical framework can be modeled
computationally. This is a very promising groundwork for
future work in computational modeling that is able to tie
both phenomenology and behavior to underlying computational
mechanisms. An important consequence of highlighting this
underappreciated link between affect and self-modeling in active
inference is that it provides a bridge between these computational
frameworks and the phenomenology of being a self (for another
account of this, see Kiverstein et al., 2020). Bodily feelings here
represent a prereflective source of information about how well
an agent is doing in their predictive engagements. These feelings
give them a sense of what they can do, of what is possible,
and what is not possible (the sense of “I can”). We have a
feel for what is possible in the world based on what we can
do in the particular situation we find ourselves within. Above,
we characterized bodily feelings as driving policy selection. The
result is that one quite literally feels drawn to relevant action
possibilities. These bodily feelings track which possibilities are
relevant to an agent and move us to improve2. The result is an
ongoing dynamic dialectic between agent and environment all
circling around affectivity.
While the importance of this ongoing tension between bodily
feeling and environmental affordances is easily overlooked when
it is functioning well, alterations in this quality can have
devastating effects on how one experiences oneself and one’s
world. With the addition of these more recent computational
models of valence as setting precision relative to changes in
control, we have now for the first time at our disposal the means
to provide the fullest expression of an active inference account of
the sense of self. In the rest of this paper, we will use this more
fully realized view of the self to propose a new unified account of
the alterations in self-experience native to depersonalization and
meditative insight.
ACTIVE INFERENCE ACCOUNTS OF
DEPERSONALIZATION
Depersonalization disorder (DPD) is still a relatively neglected
dissociative disorder. Dissociative disorders are a class of mental
illness characterized by disruptions in perception, consciousness,
and/or identity. These disruptions can cause various symptoms
that are problematic for a person’s life including social
relationships and work life. Recently, however, research into the
phenomenon of depersonalization more generally is increasing
in part due to the piqued interest of philosophers and
cognitive scientists interested in the nature and function
of the self. Depersonalization experiences potentially provide
researchers with important glimpses into the neuropsychological
mechanisms and functional profiles of our ordinary experiences
of being a self (see Metzinger on philosophy and dissociative
disorders). A hallmark of depersonalization is a disturbance
in subjective experience. This commonly includes a sense of
detachment or alienation toward themselves, their bodies, and
their environments. While specific disturbances in self-related
experiences (depersonalization) and their experience of the
environment (derealization) can come apart, they commonly co-
occur; we will have more to say about his co-occurrence shortly
(Sierra and David, 2011).
London-based writer Gracie Lofthouse writes on her own
experience of depersonalization in a recent article:
“The first time I can remember feeling like I didn’t exist, I was 15. I
was sitting on a train and all of a sudden I felt like I’d been dropped
into someone else’s body. My memories, experiences, and feelings—
the things that make up my intrinsic sense of “me-ness”—projected
2For an excellent account of the neuroscience supporting the role of affect
(including valence and arousal) in simultaneously tracking the relationship
between the organism and the environment, and preparing the organism to make
improvements to that relationship, see Lisa Feldman-Barrett’s work (2017).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 October 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 539726
fpsyg-11-539726 October 23, 2020 Time: 19:1 # 7
Deane et al. Losing Ourselves
across my mind like phantasmagoria, but I felt like they belonged
to someone else. Like I was experiencing life in the third person”
(Lofthouse, 2014).
Most people have some experience of this sort of state. If
you have not, it can be difficult to understand, and indeed,
sufferers of depersonalization commonly report difficulties
in expressing their experiences (Simeon and Abugel, 2006,
p. 80). Depersonalization symptoms can last for moments, or
several years, and commonly accompany major depression,
anxiety disorders, substance addiction, brain injury and disease,
and emotional trauma. An increasingly popular view of
depersonalization is that it may act like an “airbag” in traumatic
situations: when fight or flight are unable to remove an
overwhelming, emotionally painful, experience, then the affective
system may have its volume turned down as a direct means
of reducing the suffering. The result of this reduction is what
Medford calls it “desomaticion” or “deaffectation” (Sierra et al.,
2005; Simeon et al., 2008; Medford, 2012; Medford et al., 2016)
and is potentially the cause of the characteristically strange
phenomenon of losing something important about the self and
the world (see, e.g., Sierra and Berrios, 1998; Radovic and
Radovic, 2002; Medford et al., 2005; Sierra et al., 2005; Simeon
and Abugel, 2006; Baker et al., 2007).
In our view, predictive processing has offered some of the
most promising avenues for understanding depersonalization.
Our main aim here is to build on these and to improve on them
based on more recent developments in the literature on active
inference and the view of the self-model outlined in the previous
section. The main explanatory payoffs that we can see are not
only that we can better explain depersonalization and related
symptoms but that we are also well-placed to explain why some
instances of loss of self can have a positive valence, while others
do not. Ultimately, superficial similarities in what are described
as experiences of “loss of self ” mask deep underlying differences.
Existing Predictive Processing Accounts
of Depersonalization
Seth et al. (2012) were perhaps the first to apply predictive
processing to depersonalization, and since then, Gerrans (2019)
has also provided an account. Seth et al. (2012) build their
account on the central notion of “conscious presence.” Since
“presence” involves both a sense of oneself as present in the
world, and the world as present to us, it casts depersonalization
and derealization as two sides of the same coin. To briefly
summarize their account, they build on work in schizophrenia
research on the loss of the sense of agency (e.g., Frith, 1987;
Blakemore et al., 2000) according to which this arises from
imprecise predictions about the sensory consequences of actions
(see also Agentive Control, above). This account gets adapted to
account for presence. According to Seth et al. (2012),
“presence is the result of successful suppression by top-down
predictions of informative interoceptive signals evoked (directly)
by autonomic control signals and (indirectly) by bodily responses
to afferent sensory signals. According to the model, disorders
of presence (as in DPD) follow from pathologically imprecise
interoceptive predictive signals.” (p. 2)
Our account builds on this in a number of respects. First,
this account is based on a view of emotion as interoceptive
inference. So is ours, in a sense, but what Seth and colleagues
mean is emotion as interoceptive perceptual inference. In other
words, as they explicitly state (p. 1), they are fleshing out the
James–Lange theory of emotion (James, 1890) according to which
emotion is perception of bodily (specifically visceral) change.
Given a PP gloss, whereas perception is the result of model
selection for minimizing prediction error from sense perception,
emotion is simply model selection for minimizing prediction
error from interoception. This is perceptual inference since the
model has to accommodate the input. Building on our recent
work (Miller and Clark, 2017; Wilkinson et al., 2019), we, in
contrast, view emotion, and affect more generally, as involving
active inference, too. In terms of ACM, it is a central part of
allostasis. This brings us to another crucial difference with our
view. The view of emotion as interoceptive model building tells us
nothing about valence. And yet, emotion has valence: it tends to
be either positive or negative (and to greater or lesser degrees). In
contrast, we tie positive valence to allostatic control (and negative
valence to lack of such control). This means, crucially, given
what we say later, that valence falls naturally out of our account,
both of affect in general but also of self-loss, both negative and
positive, in particular.
Unlike Seth and colleagues’ account, Gerrans’ account does
not take presence as a basic notion out of which both self
and self-loss emerge for free. Instead, Gerrans appeals to the
notion of a “self-model” or, perhaps more accurately, the idea
that the self-features as part of an overall predictive model that
determines conscious experience. Gerrans’ main point is that our
ordinary experience of the world, and ourselves, is generated
by a constant integration of cognitive, perceptual, and affective
signals. Building on his earlier work with Chris Letheby (Letheby
and Gerrans, 2017), the self here is part of a predictive model, one
that works to explain away the affective changes that occur as the
organism engages with its environment. When affective signals
go missing, the predictive system needs to explain the absence.
Gerrans’ approach to explaining depersonalization focuses on
the role of affect in the generation of our felt sense of presence
(Seth, 2013). Like Seth et al. (2012), Gerrans concludes that when
predictions about ordinary affective reactions are not fulfilled, the
system generates the sense of the agent being no longer present
in the experience. In short, Gerrans builds on Seth et al. but
adds the self-more explicitly into the model. To the extent that
Gerrans’ account is similar to Seth and colleagues’ account, it
shares many of the same differences with our own. Nevertheless,
we like the embellishment of adding the self as a feature of the
predictive model. In a sense, we would agree with Gerrans that
presence emerges from a basic notion of self rather than the
other way around.
What both of these existing accounts have in common,
with respect to depersonalization, is the focus on affective
numbing based on alterations (viz., inaccuracies) to interoceptive
predictive processing. We do not disagree. However, what we
add to the picture is the idea that affect carries inbuilt valence,
involves active inference (allostasis), and, crucially, plays a role in
setting precision weighting. This has the welcome side effect of
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allowing us to neatly explain other features of depersonalization
beyond simply affective numbing. It also generates an account of
depersonalization according to which it is inherently a negative
experience (rather than something that needs to be appraised as
such after the fact). These two other accounts tell us why there
might be a loss of sense of self but not why that is negative.
Given the existence of extremely positive experiences of self-
loss (“enlightened” states), the negativity of the experience is not
something that should be taken for granted. Our explanation
of this large difference in valence is that superficial similarities
are masking quite radical differences in what is going on
in the two cases.
In the next section, we will propose that ACM can do a
better job at accounting for depersonalization experiences than
previous PP accounts. In particular, we will develop a view of
depersonalization as a loss of allostatic control.
ACM Account of Depersonalization
Recall that the ACM casts the sense of self as underpinned
by an inference about the system’s endogenous control of self-
evidencing outcomes. The highest levels of the self-model are also
the most enduring, due to their being the most invariant across
contexts. These higher levels that track how well we are able
to control our interactions with the environment (i.e., allostatic
control), more generally, act as hyper-priors informing more
domain general precision estimations. The result of the sense
of self being hierarchically deep in this way is that a temporary
loss of control within a particular context may not necessarily
reduce a more general sense of control or a sense of control across
contexts. In other words, someone can fail to play the violin well
without losing confidence in their ability to live a good life.
This inference about allostatic control—manifesting as
affective valence—plays a role in setting precision relative to
changes in how well or poorly we are doing at reducing
error given the context. Sensitivity to unexpected increases in
prediction error rates—manifesting here phenomenologically as
negative valence—acts as a disincentive to continue operating in
a particular context (Kiverstein et al., 2017; Hesp et al., 2019).
For example, when learning an instrument, if a certain song is
too complex given our skill level, the feelings of frustration that
arise could motivate task switching perhaps to a simpler song
or to developing some of the skills necessary to eventually play
the more complex tune. Task switching here offers a way for the
system to get back to reducing error at a better rate.
However, what happens when the system cannot resolve the
negative affect through task switching? In other words, how
would such a system behave if unexpected error continued to rise
regardless of perceptual updates and behavioral interventions?
For example, in active inference terms, trauma could be
understood as a massive influx of prediction error causing
the system to drastically lower confidence (precision) in its
action models (see Linson et al., 2020). In the case of physical
trauma, the body’s integrity, which is highly expected, is seriously
disrupted or damaged. The system in this situation is unable
to reduce errors either by updating their models (perceptual
inference) or acting in a way that will bring their expectations
back in line with the current situation (active inference). This
disparity between expected control of prediction error and the
error-riddled reality produces huge amounts of negative affect,
which, as we have discussed above, reduces certainty on the
currently selected policy as a means of tuning the agent to better
predictive opportunities.
If an external situation continues to create error (i.e., severe
pain) over an extended period of time, and the agent cannot
control the situation through switching domain or context (that
would otherwise be controllable), the resulting drop in precision
on expected free energy is going to be such that consequent
transitions between higher level affective states will be forced into
the same fearful state continuously. The ascending message from
the negative “affective charge” (Hesp et al., 2019) will override the
descending message from higher level policies (i.e., our ability
to control error by task switching also fails to resolve the issue,
and so we lose confidence domain general control). That means
that you have exactly the same effect at the next level, whereby
the desired state (positive affect) is never reached despite trying
to control it, leading to a drop in the precision on expected
free energy at that level, and so on upwards. Crucially though,
for this to happen, the person would have to never give up the
resistance to the fear/pain, i.e., maintain a high precision on
that goal state (i.e., the phylogenetically expectation to have a
healthy, well-functioning body). In time, the “hopeless” situation
might eventually create a learned belief that, no matter what they
do, they will always be in a negative valence state (i.e., valence
state transitions are not conditioned by policies and are stable in
“negative”). It would basically be a perfect storm for a gridlock
situation where you have a strong preference against the negative
state but then you also know that you cannot escape it no matter
what you do. The only option is to dissolve the process that is
creating the negative affect in the first place since nothing else can
work. The consequence would be an unraveling of the process
by which we form affective states (i.e., inferring confidence in
expected free energy) and with it the sense of self 3.
The dampening of affect and the feeling of self-loss are
intimately related here. In losing a sense of allostatic control, the
system ceases to posit itself as a causally efficacious controller
of sensations. Accordingly, in losing a sense that the system has
allostatic control across contexts, the affective system ceases to
tune to opportunities to reduce error. Nothing is motivationally
salient because the system infers that it is not causally efficacious
in bringing about self-evidencing outcomes, and as such, it infers
a global loss of confidence in precision on action policies (see
Kiverstein et al., 2020). The result would be that the world would
lose some of its phenomenal depth—it would cease to solicit one’s
engagements and so be perceived (just as DPD sufferers suggest)
as two-dimensional, or flat (Medford et al., 2006, p. 93). The result
is, as Colombetti and Ratcliffe write, that “The world ceases to
matter, people and events are not salient anymore. With this, the
world ceases to move and affect one through one’s body” (2012,
p. 148; see also work by Sass and Parnas, 2003; Fuchs, 2005).
This proposal casts new light on various circumstances of
occurrence surrounding experiences of depersonalization. For
3Thanks to Lars Sandved-Smith for discussions about the computational nature of
depersonalization.
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example, consider a traumatic stressor such as torture, which is
perhaps the most reliable instigator of depersonalization (Kira
et al., 2013). On the current account, sustained inefficiency
of the motivational system (in this case, severe pain over an
extended period of time) in a scenario where the person has
no control to act to resolve the prediction error results in a
global loss of confidence in “tuning” affective responses. Another
example is major depression. Depression can be understood as
a domain general inference of loss of allostatic control, where,
in extreme cases, the system ceases to posit itself as a causally
efficacious agent (Fabry, 2019; Kiverstein et al., 2020). The
chronic stress of an uncertain or volatile environment means
eventually that the system ceases to posit endogenous control on
the outcomes as the occurrence of positive/negative outcomes is
inferred to be independent of the agent’s actions. Through the
current framework, the comorbidity of major depression with
depersonalization can be understood to be a sustained loss of
allostatic self-efficacy. Stephan and colleagues proposed that “the
performance of interoceptive-allostatic circuitry is monitored
by a metacognitive layer that updates beliefs about the brain’s
capacity to successfully regulate bodily states” (Stephan et al.,
2016, p. 1), which they dub “allostatic self-efficacy.” Other
accounts have proposed that depression functions as a means of
reducing prediction error associated with adverse social contexts
(Badcock et al., 2017). If this is along the right lines, depression
itself would function as a means of motivating withdrawal from
potentially aversive contexts. The link between major depression
and depersonalization can be understood here in terms of the
system ceasing to posit itself as an endogenous controller of
self-evidencing outcomes—when there are no possible context to
move to (no high level, temporally deep goal priors to realize), the
total loss of allostatic control is experienced as depersonalization4.
In the next section, we turn our attention to an example of
a potentially euphoric selfless experience, namely, the sorts of
selfless experiences that can arise from meditation. A view of the
self-model in terms of allostatic control gives a fitting account of
this and shows how this kind of selfless experience is radically
different (indeed, relative to control, they are diametrically
opposed) to selfless experience in depersonalization.
ACM ACCOUNT OF MEDITATIVE
SELFLESSNESS
While meditation is something of an umbrella term, the
disciplined control of attention is central to almost all styles of
meditation (Albahari, 2009; Austin, 2013; Garfield, 2015; Millière
et al., 2018). For brevity, we will focus here specifically on
focused attention meditation. Meditation here takes the form of
consciously attending to a particular object (i.e., bodily sensation
or breathing), and when the mind wanders from the chosen
target and the practitioner realizes the shift, they actively “let go”
4Interestingly, this account is suggestive that the hyperreflective tendency to
check one’s body and one’s current state common in people suffering from
depersonalization (Colombetti and Ratcliffe, 2012) could be understood as
compensatory behavior aimed at reducing the uncertainty relating to the perceived
loss of control over interoceptive states.
of the distractor and reorient their attention back to the initial
meditative target.
Active inference has recently begun to be applied to
thinking about meditation (Farb et al., 2015; Pagnoni and
Guareschi, 2015). Lutz et al. (2019) have provided the first
account of focused attention meditation in terms of active
inference. Focused attention meditation is described as having
two interrelated aims: the pragmatic activity of regulating
attention on a particular object (i.e., the breath sensations,
an object) and the epistemological activity of increasing one’s
understanding of the nature of the meditative object and the
various distractors, in particular recognizing their dynamic and
impersonal nature (Lutz, 28).
In active inference terms, the pragmatic aspect of focused
attention meditation requires that top–down directed precision
enhance the behavioral policies associated with stable attention
on an object. The challenge for the meditator then is to
maintain this policy, although multiple other policies may
be simultaneously active and acting as competitors for
selection (Pezzulo and Cisek, 2016). In meditation, this
ongoing competition becomes simplified to include only the
policy of maintaining attention on the meditation object and
all other competing policies attempting to divert attentional
resources elsewhere (e.g., spontaneous memories, future
planning, homeostatic concerns, mind wandering, etc.). Inaction
during this process is considered crucial, as it is the process of
setting top–down precision on the sensory signals associated
with the meditative object that allows this dialectic between
focused attention and distraction to unfold and to be consciously
attended to. Lutz and colleagues suggest that this quality of
“inaction” corresponds to the subjective experience of “letting
go” of the various distractions (p. 28).
Over time, the meditator can learn to allow the various
distracting thoughts and sensations to arise and pass without
disturbing their concentration, that is, without disrupting the
meditation policy of focused attention. In part, this occurs
through learning to actively reduce precision on the distracting
(negative) goal prior. Inaction itself does this to some degree.
An itch motivates, via negative valence, a scratching policy
because of the preference for the non-itching state (i.e., goal
prior) and the high precision on the itching state (i.e., resistance
to the sensations), as well as the learned connection between
the itch and the action policy scratching. By not acting, and
calmly observing the itch, the negative preference loses precision
(i.e., resistance to the sensations is dropped). The result is
that the probability of the sensation driving the selection of
a new (distracted) policy is also lessened. In other words,
meditators can actively reduce certainty on goal states and
mitigate involuntary policy selection through inaction. The result
is that over time, such goal priors cease to draw processing (i.e.,
attention) in the same way.
In line with our view that the system infers its own control
in terms of correspondence of action–outcome contingencies,
here, the system learns endogenous control on the precision
of goal priors through repeated reduction via opting for the
focused attention policy. Over time, the decrease in distractibility
can be understood as an increased ability to endogenously
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control precision on goal priors. The system here refines
attentional selection through mental action in a way analogous
to refining motor commands through iterative inference of
control of action–outcome contingencies (Miall and Wolpert,
1996; Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001). Note that learning to actively
adjust precision on goal priors in this way is to learn to exert
exactly the kind of control that is missing or weakened in cases
of depersonalization as characterized above. In those cases, an
inability to reduce precision on a goal prior that was unattainable
leads to tremendous suffering and a loss of confidence in our
ability to control the world more generally. In learning that it
can endogenously set precision, it now begins to infer a domain
general sense of being able to realize its goal states. This increase
in domain general control may correspond to the pervasive
feelings of joy and peace that characterize long-term meditation
(Dambrun and Ricard, 2011; Dambrun, 2016).
During the course of becoming an adept meditator, one
develops the ability to remain poised between the object of
attention and the ongoing flow of spontaneous mental activities.
This capacity to remain subtly focused on the meditative object,
while at the same time observing clearly the spontaneous mental
activity, provides an optimal opportunity to learn about the
process of policy selection taking place within its own system
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). This is the epistemological element of
focused meditation. The result of this introspective investigation
is a gradual “opacification” of these mental processes (Carter
et al., 2005). A mental process is considered transparent insofar
as its contents are available to consciousness, while its non-
intentional structure or construction process are not (Metzinger,
2003). Without having access to the earlier stages of processing,
transparent processes are presented subjectively as fundamentally
real and personally essential. Metzinger writes,
“Transparent phenomenal states make their representational
content appear as irrevocably real, as something the existence of
which you cannot doubt. Put more precisely, you may certainly be
able cognitively to have doubts about its existence, but according
to subjective experience this phenomenal content—the awfulness
of pain, the fact that it is your own pain—is not something you
can distance yourself from. The phenomenol-ogy of transparency
is the phenomenology of direct realism and in the domain
of self-representation it creates the phenomenology of identifi-
cation.” (2017, p. 248).
By continually letting go, the distracting policy selections
are observed as non-essential—they arise, they persist for some
time, and they eventually dissolve without the need for overt
actions. The system becomes aware of the constructed nature
of these precision assignments (e.g., itching directly leading
to scratching). Through repeated observation of this process,
the system ceases to identify with the precision selections,
exactly because it observes them to occur without attributing
them to a “self ” as an endogenous cause. Recall that the
system infers itself as a self—as an endogenous cause of
sensations—through agentive actions, where the correspondence
between action–outcome contingency feels agentive. Through
repeated reorientation of attention back to the meditation
target (by reengaging the meditation policy), the automatic
precision assignments (e.g., itch→scratch) cease to be identified
as essential and so begin to lose the quality of immediateness
and irrefutability that come with being transparent. Crucially,
as the system observes these precision allocations occurring
independently of agentive engagement (due to the non-action
policy currently being engaged), the usual means of inferring
itself as a self-due to the correspondence of action–outcome
contingencies is disrupted, and processes occurring in the system
increasingly appear as non-essential to the self. This point about
opacification is an important one for our discussion about
selfless experiences.
This ties in closely with the “non-self ” themes in Buddhism.
Common to all Buddhist schools is a critique of our ordinary self-
experiences. The Buddhist doctrine of no-self (anattā) teaches
that our ordinary self-experience is both mistaken and an
important source of human suffering. The mistake is the common
assumption that behind the various psychophysical processes that
make up our conscious experiences, there is a single, essential
subject, who is responsible for constructing and owning those
processes. However, when we turn our attention inwards in an
attempt to catch a glimpse of this assumed subject, all we ever
experience is the dynamic and impersonal processes. This is
the point—while we commonly assume there to be an essential
and unconstructed subject, that sense of being a subject is in
fact constructed from the interaction of our cognitive–behavioral
processes. The Buddhist move here is not to deny that the
sense of self is real, that quality of experience that delineates
my sensations from yours. Rather, the selfless insight Buddhist
meditators seek out is the transformative recognition that, while
the self unreflectively appears to us as essential, persisting, and
unified, it is in fact constructed, impermanent, and dynamic (see
Davis and Thompson, 2017).
According to the Buddhist tradition, our mistaken
assumptions about the self are generated and maintained
by craving (tanha in Pali). Craving is a technical term here; it
describes the felt urgency or motivational drive to make the
world conform to our desires—our anxiety to perpetuate positive
feelings and reduce negative ones. This ongoing emotional
investment is what unifies the various impersonal psychophysical
processes under a single idea: a persistent and essential self. In
turn, the more we identify with our specific concerns or roles,
the more intense the motivation to bring about those states
in the world5. In humans, these desires expand beyond basic
homeostatic concerns (i.e., being fed and watered) to include
the wider constellation of ideas and roles we appropriate into
our identity (i.e., being a student). In Buddhism, this craving
is thought to be responsible for significant human suffering.
Consider the difference in magnitude between the relatively
short-lived pain of breaking an arm, and the potentially life
long suffering of losing an opportunity to play a beloved sport
professionally. At the heart of Buddhism is the teaching that,
while pain is unavoidable (i.e., the broken bone), our reaction to
it (i.e., the craving to be a professional player) is optional. It is
the craving, and not the pain, that is thought to be transformed
5For a neuroscientific account of this relationship between identification and
motivation, see Damasio (2003).
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through meditation and with it the mistaken sense of self that
craving engenders.
Meditation is presented as a vehicle for reducing craving and
disrupting the mistaken view of self. In the satipatthana sutta,
the foremost early Buddhist text on meditation, the student
is directed to divide their experience into five categories (or
“aggregates”) of phenomena: bodily form, valence, perception,
volitional activities, and consciousness. These aggregates together
are thought to create the experience of being a subject (Hamilton,
2000; Shulman, 2014). The aim of meditation here is to
reduce one’s identification with these psychophysical processes
by closely examining each individually and their interactions and
systematically noting their impersonal nature. In Anattalakkhan. a
Suttam, the Buddha suggests that meditators observe each
aggregate, saying to themselves “not-I” or “not-my-self.” As the
various psychophysical processes that make up the self-come
to be experienced as “not-I,” the constructed nature of the self
becomes apparent.
In addition to non-meditation policies (i.e., distractions) being
driven by changes in goal states, they are also driven by our
affective reactions to those goal states. As we have seen, valence
sets precision relative to our ability to reduce error given a certain
goal. Ordinarily, once a goal state is selected (predicted), any
hesitancy in responding in the ways that the system has learned
to expect produces negative valence, which has the effect of
increasing the drive on policy selection as an attempt to catch
up to the predicted slope. As long as valence is experienced
transparently, it has this powerful motivating effect on actions.
The meditator then must also be able to reduce the certainty
on the valenced reactions that occur from their commitment to
non-action. By attending to the valenced sensations themselves
(i.e., the discomfort of not reacting), the system learns that
these signals too are changing and non-essential. As soon as
one has made the observation that non-action makes them
uncomfortable, these systems are already being rendered opaque.
Focused attention meditation then simultaneously makes opaque
precision on goal priors (i.e., the confidence in the degree of
wanting or not wanting certain states) and precision on expected
free energy reduction that is given affectively.
In Buddhism, reflecting on valence (vedana in pali) is
considered especially important in the process of relinquishing
craving and disrupting the mistaken view of the self. Valence is
considered the “weak link” in the process that gives rise to both
craving and the mistaken view of self (Anālayo, 2009). In non-
meditators, valence conditions craving: pleasant feelings give rise
to attachment; painful feelings give rise to resistance. In contrast,
long-term meditators are thought to be able to experience valence
without further craving-driven responses. The Buddha taught,
“Touched by that pleasant feeling he does not lust after pleasure or
continue to lust after pleasure. That pleasant feeling of his ceases.
With the cessation of the pleasant feeling, painful feeling arises.
Touched by that painful feeling, he does not sorrow, grieve, and
lament, he does not weep beating his breast and becomes distraught”
(Ñānamoli and Bodhi, 1995, p. 334).
Notice that even for the “well-taught noble disciple” (that
is, meditators who no longer operate under craving and
illusory notions of the self), valenced states still arise. These
states are in and of themselves neutral in terms of well-
being (Harris, 2018). It is the strong motivational impulse
to act (i.e., fleeing our pain; grasping at joys) in response
to those signals that the Buddhist meditative project aims to
transform. A close meditative investigation of valence is taught
to have the effect of separating valence from craving, the result
being that one begins to react with less preference relative to
pleasure and pain. As Buddhist scholar Albahari writes, “As
mental suffering is finally eliminated through insight [into the
non-self-nature of these processes], unpleasant vedanā will be
confined to only physical (not mental) suffering” (Albahari,
2014, p. 11). As our urgency to react in self-serving ways
diminishes, so too does the illusion of being an enduring
and essential subject. The culmination of this process of
extinguishing craving is nibbāna [enlightenment]: “the final flash
of insight that burns out tan. hā and the sense of self for good”
(Albahari, 2014, p. 11).
The gradual opacification of valence results in various positive
effects discussed in the Buddhist paradigm. As described above,
inaction would allow for the opacification and dereification
of the valence system. As valence is increasingly modeled
(made opaque), it ceases to invoke that powerful sense of
urgency (associated with the Buddhist notion of craving or
tan. haā; Albahari, 2014), which, as we saw above, results
from valence being experienced transparently and so presented
phenomenologically as both immediately real and essential to
the self (Metzinger, 2003). This change is an important one,
as it results in the loss of the driving force that perpetuates
the sense that there is an essential subject within and behind
the various processes (Albahari, 2014). As valence is made
opaque, and control over goal prior precisions is achieved,
craving ceases due to its disentanglement from the conditioning
influence of pleasure or pain. Thus, the illusion of self is
disrupted. In gaining endogenous control on the precision of
goal priors, meditation therefore enables the system to pull
these apart so that (dis)liking does not need to condition (not)
wanting, allowing the suffering associated with craving (and
aversion) to be avoided. Gaining insight into the process by
which valence is driven by our goal priors would have the
consequence of allowing one to actively separate the two darts
discussed by the Buddha. One comes to understand how pain
(deviation from a goal prior) leads to suffering (transparent
negative valence signaling the deviation from the goal prior and
its expected resolution); that suffering occurs only insofar as
we desire to avoid the pain (high precision on the goal prior
drives error dynamics); and finally, although we often cannot
do anything about the pain itself, we can, by watching the
whole process closely, render the valenced reactions opaque
and so reduce the degree to which valence drives policy
selection. That is, we can reduce the craving and suffering that
arises from transparent valenced reactions simply by observing
closely the link between pain and discomfort, thereby rendering
the valence opaque.
The opacification of this part of the precision machinery
opens new opportunities for control. Observing our valenced
reactions allows us to develop new higher order policies about
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how precision (via valence) is being set on policies6. In other
words, instead of valenced signals adjusting precision on policies
directly, and so automatically conditioning us to behave in
certain ways, one can now learn to activate alternative policies
depending on the usefulness of the valenced signals. For example,
mindfulness has been shown to be highly effective in helping
people to quit smoking cigarettes (Bowen and Marlatt, 2009).
The practice here is to disrupt the pattern leading from craving
to using by selecting a policy to closely attend to the feelings
of craving—the negative valence driving processing toward the
expected rate of error reduction relative to nicotine levels—every
time they arise. The new goal now activated every time there
is a craving (instead of smoking a cigarette) is to watch, as
closely as possible the arising, the progression and the inevitable
depletion of the craving-related feelings. Overtime, these sorts
of mindfulness practices have the effect of teaching the system
that cravings are in fact just feelings in the body, which can be
allowed to direct processing and behavior or not7. This discovery
can represent a major return of control for people struggling
with substance addiction. Notice that valence here does not
go missing through this process of opacification (as it does in
depersonalization). Rather, valence begins to be interpreted by
the system as what it is: information that can be useful, but is not
essential, in selecting policies.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we seek to better understand the nature of the self
from the perspective of the increasingly popular active inference
framework. Within this framework, we present a novel account
of the self, in terms of an allostatic control model (ACM; Deane,
2020). Central to the ACM account is a view of affect as a second-
order process that guides the predictive system (via precision
weighting) toward opportunities to improve. This is a novel take
on affect that we have been developing over a number of recent
publications (Kiverstein et al., 2017, 2020; Miller et al., 2020).
We then put this account to work in trying to understand two
starkly contrasting forms of self-loss, namely, depersonalization
and the selfless experiences attained through meditation (viz.,
Buddhist no-self insights). Given our proposed framework,
these two varieties of selfless experience are characterized by
stark differences in the systems degree of control: whereas
depersonalization is expressly characterized as resulting from a
critical loss of inferred control, selflessness in the context of
meditative practices is marked by a significant gain in control.
There is today, however, an increasingly popular idea
that depersonalization and the selfless experiences attained
through meditation are somehow closely related. Meditation
teacher and neuroscience enthusiast Shinzen Young has called
depersonalization the “evil twin” of the Buddhist notion of
enlightenment (Lofthouse, 2014). Part of what motivates this
association, so it seems, are similarities in first personal accounts
6See Smith et al. (2020) for a computational model of this process.
7Notice here that the common phenomenology of long-term meditators being able
to simply “let go” of mental and emotional distractions is closely related to the
increase in control that we are proposing this meditative process engenders.
of both kinds of selfless states. Sufferers of depersonalization and
long-term meditators make surprisingly similar reports about
reductions in their experience of being agents of their actions
and as owners of their thoughts and behaviors. While these first
personal accounts can sound very similar, given our framework,
this is where the family resemblance ends.
As we have shown throughout this paper, there are important
computational differences between these two selfless experiences.
Of particular importance is the difference in how affective valence
contributes to either state. Depersonalization is characterized as a
loss of control, leading to the dampening of these affective valence
systems. In meditation, there occurs a gradual opacification
of the affective valence system. This opacification produces
an important change in the meditator’s relationship with the
positive and negative affect—specifically, by no longer being
automatically appropriated into their self-model. This has the
result that changes in valence no longer create the existential
urgency for change they would otherwise. It is important to note
here that valence remains perfectly intact, continuing to tune the
agent toward opportunities to improve in their predictive success.
The purpose of the practice is not to disrupt valence itself (as
happens in depersonalization) but rather to become conscious
of the precision estimators in a way that allows them to select
more skillful and beneficial policies. What is permanently altered
in the meditation process is the system’s reaction to those signals.
While there is still the experience of frustration and joy, there is
no longer the sense of being an essential subject to appropriate
these states as “me” and “mine.” This insight leads to an eventual
dissolving of our misguided idea that we are a single and enduring
thing, to be replaced by an acknowledgment that we are a
dynamic, self-organizing process. Far from reducing control,
and in direct contrast to depersonalization, this development of
one’s metacognitive abilities here allows one to contextualize and
control precision estimations in new and powerful ways.
Notice then that for someone to transition from experiences
of depersonalization to the selfless states attained through
meditation, they would first need to regain their phenomenal
access to those affective responses. Without affect playing its
role in tuning the system (relative to its predictive success), the
opacification and subsequent insight into the nature of those
precision processes could not occur. To be clear, we are not
suggesting that the endeavor of bringing affect back online for
people suffering depersonalization should be carried out through
meditation specifically8. Rather, our point is that those affective
signals would have to first become available for introspective
access in order to be modeled in the way facilitated by focused
meditation. This follows from the fact that, on our account, it is
not the loss of affectivity that results in the selfless experiences
sought after by Buddhist meditators but the process of modeling
those affective changes that opens the way for a new perspective
of the self and a new layer of control to emerge.
In terms of control, depersonalization and selfless experiences
sought after by mediators are, computationally speaking, polar
opposites. And yet, there is something important to be said
here about the potential focused attention meditation has to
8See Lindahl and Britton (2019) for reasons why that might be challenging.
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provoke depersonalization experiences. Britton’s Dark Night
Project has documented and investigated a large number of
personal reports on various difficulties that can accompany
meditative practices9. Britton (2019) suggests that adopting a
persistent attitude of turning toward difficult stimuli and focusing
on negative emotions can lead to negative outcomes. This aspect
of mindfulness training has positive effects for some people,
primarily by helping them to facilitate a gradual sensitization to
negative affect. Such exposure approaches to therapy are thought
to work by reducing avoidance, which has been shown to play
a leading role in the generation and maintenance of various
psychological disorders (Barry et al., 2015). However, exposure
therapies are most effective for people who tend toward high
levels of avoidance (McNally, 2018). In other, low-avoidance
personality types, anxiety and dissociative disorders can be
produced and exacerbated by facilitating an attentional bias
toward threat (MacLeod et al., 2002; Eldar et al., 2008). The fact is
that the most effective treatment for an individual will depend on
their baseline attitude toward threat. Given our account above,
it makes sense why inappropriately meditating on traumatic
events (that is beyond a certain healthy window of tolerance)
could create depersonalization effects. If depersonalization is an
airbag deployed when fight or flight would not work for getting
one out of a traumatic emotional experience, then persistently
9 See also Segal (2002) and Lindahl and Britton (2019) for clear accounts of the
relationship between meditation and depersonalization.
meditating on an overwhelmingly traumatic experience while
practicing inaction produces just those conditions. In effect, it
could act like a kind of psychological self-torture. Meditation,
in this case, would begin to lead to a perceived loss of allostatic
self-efficacy, rather than toward the liberating states of self-
understanding it is meant to.
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